

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The Impact of European Security Architecture Changes on United States – European Relations

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ABSTRACT

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The changes in the European security architecture are the direct result of the changes in the threat since the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the reduced threat to Europe required the re-evaluation of the security and defense needs of the continent. The emergence of the new threat requires security structures that are light, agile, self-sustaining, and highly mobile. This paper will examine the impact of these recent changes in the European security architecture on United States – European relations. It will focus on the European Security and Defense Identify, the European Security and Defense Policy, as well as the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force, NATO's Response Force and NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative / Prague Capabilities Commitment. The paper also examines the evolving relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.

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THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE CHANGES ON UNITED STATES – EUROPEAN RELATIONS

BACKGROUND

The leaders of post World War II Europe found their countries devastated from years of conflict. The reconstruction of entire social, political and military systems could overwhelm the delicate economic condition that existed in post World War II Europe. The consensus among progressive governments was that countries must band together for the common good of a common Europe. This meant that countries with strained and sometimes bloody relationships had to put aside their differences and face the new challenges that were ahead. Not only did the leaders have to face the daunting challenges of rebuilding Europe but also the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Western Allies, the Soviet Union continued to occupy land and maintain an army at full wartime strength. The Soviet presence preoccupied leaders on both sides of the Atlantic for nearly five decades.

The United States did not want the conditions that existed after World War I to exist in post World War II Europe. Many thought that the economic, political and social turmoil that existed after World War I were the root causes that lead directly to the conditions that triggered World War II. The United States and Europe recognized that Europe could not recover alone and that disaster would strike Europe again without American aid. Another concern was the political and economic environment that was a breeding ground for the spread of the new menace, Communism.¹

Through the Marshall plan, the United States spent billions of dollars on the reconstruction effort of Europe. For many years, the United States and Europe shared the common interests and goals of Soviet containment, mutual security, and prosperity for both sides of the Atlantic.²

Although there exists hundred of treaties between the United States with dozens of European organizations, this paper will examine the security arrangements between the United States and the three major security organizations in Europe. A brief historical background and status of the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union will be helpful in understanding the complexities of the changing security arrangements within Europe. Figure 1 graphically depicts the member states of these organizations.




FIGURE 1 MEMBER STATES OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The Western European Union (WEU) was created by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defense, as amended by the Paris Protocol in 1954.³

The Brussels Treaty was in response to the Soviet Union's aggressive posture to control the countries of Central Europe, and as such was the first attempt to form a united Europe. The Treaty's main feature was the commitment to the mutual defense should any of the Member States be attacked. A military plan initiated in the framework of the Brussels Treaty Organization for the common defense was adopted in 1948, involving the integration of air defenses and a joint command organization.⁴

Up to this point, the United States had been reluctant to actively participate in European security arrangements because Europe had not shown the resolve to work together for the common good. The Brussels Treaty Organization relieved Washington's reluctance and led the way for talks between North America and Europe, eventually leading to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington in 1949. The Washington Treaty formalized the commitment by the United States and Canada to the defense of Europe.

The Washington Treaty required the appropriate political and military structures to back up the commitments of the Treaty, which led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization. In 1950, the Brussels Treaty signatories merged their military organization into NATO, which became the dominant security organization in Western Europe.

The question of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the security structures within Europe remained a major issue. One initiative was to create a separate European army (European Defense Community) that would operate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's structure. This proposal was never ratified in the capitals of Western Europe and eventually died. The failure of this initiative set the stage for the Paris Agreement that led to the formal integration of Germany into the western European security structure. The Brussels Treaty amended by the Paris agreements created the Western European Union as an international organization.

The WEU has been involved in actual military operations other than war (MOOTW) for the past decade. These humanitarian/peace support operation missions were derived from the crisis management tasks that are at the core of the European common security and defense policy and known as the Petersberg Tasks.⁵

The United States, although not a member, has had a solid working relationship with the WEU. Through its permanent seat on the joint WEU-NATO Council, the United States wielded a certain amount of influence. The WEU, for its part, has been a staunch supporter of NATO and has been instrumental in strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance.⁶

The dissolution of the WEU Military Staff in 2001 represented the end of the WEU's crisis management responsibilities/capabilities.⁷ The WEU, with the support of NATO, made the decision to transfer its operational role to the European Union (EU) thus strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy within the EU. Since the transfer of the WEU's operational activities to the EU, the WEU Assembly has served in the capacity of the interim European Security and Defense Assembly, focusing on ESDP and remaining involved in political and defense issues within Europe.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

In the years after World War II, many western leaders believed the policies of the Soviet Union threatened international stability and peace. The forcible installation of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, the territorial demands by the Soviets, and their support for the dismantlement of democratic regimes appeared to many as the first steps of World War III. Such events prompted the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty in 1947 between Britain and France, which pledged a common defense against aggression. Subsequent events, including the rejection by Eastern European nations of the European Recovery Program

(Marshall Plan) and the creation of Cominform, a European Communist organization led to the Brussels Treaty. Among the goals of the pact was the collective defense of its members.⁸ The Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1948 led to negotiations between Western Europe, Canada, and the United States that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The original purpose of NATO was to defend Western Europe against possible attack by the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO reached out to former members of the Warsaw Pact and in 1999 former Warsaw Pact members Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic became members of NATO, bringing the total membership to 19 nations. In 2002, Russia was formalized as a limited partner to NATO as a member of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO has also reached out to other non-aligned countries through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, an important factor in developing new security relationships between the Alliance and these former Soviet block countries.⁹ PfP is expanding and intensifying political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increasing stability, diminishing threats to peace and building confidence. It has strengthened security relationships by promoting a spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to the democratic principles that are at the core of the Alliance. NATO is presently made up of nineteen members, seven aspirants, and is associated with twenty-six PfP nation states and Russia.

Although the original mission has changed, NATO's bottom line is to enhance the stability, well being, and freedom of its members through a system of collective security and cooperation.¹⁰ Members of the alliance agree to defend one another from attack. The creation of NATO has led to closer ties among its members, fostered mutual interests, and guaranteed peace and stability in Europe.

The United States, being the largest contributor to NATO in financial and material support, has in the past been able to influence the Alliance direction from within. The United States has also used its bilateral agreements with member states to influence the outcome of an issue. The United States has influence on the strategic military level as well. Supreme Allied Commanders, Atlantic, and Europe are perpetual United States billets.

For the first time in its history, NATO evoked Article 5 in response to the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States. Article 5 is the article which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more members "shall be considered an attack against them all."¹¹ At the request of the United States, NATO promptly deployed Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft to American airspace. NATO also continues to be involved in all manner of MOOTW from SFOR (Bosnia) and KFOR (Kosovo) to Operation Noble Eagle in the United States.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) was formally established on November 1, 1993 and is the most recent in a series of European cooperative organizations that originated with the European Coal and Steel Community evolution into the European Community. In 1991, the governments of the 12 member states signed and ratified the Treaty on European Union (commonly called the Maastricht Treaty). The Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community into the EU.

The EU has a number of objectives. It works to promote and expand cooperation among its members in several areas, including economics and trade, social issues, foreign policy, security, and judicial matters. Most post World War II proposals for a European organization had political and economic, as well as self-defense motives. The political motive has been based on the belief that only a supranational organization could eliminate the threat of war between European countries. Supporters of European political unity further believed that if the nations of Europe were to resume a significant role in world affairs, they had to speak with one voice and command security resources comparable to those of the United States.

The economic motive rested on the argument that larger markets would promote increased competition and thus lead to higher productivity and standards of living. Economic and political viewpoints merged, in the assumption that economic strength was the basis of political and military power, and that a fully integrated European economy would make conflict between European nations less likely.

The members of the EU cooperate in three areas, often referred to as pillars. At the heart of this system is the European Commission pillar with its governing institutions. The European Commission pillar is flanked by two pillars focused on intergovernmental cooperation: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). These two pillars are a result of the Maastricht agreement to develop closer cooperation in these areas.

The CFSP and JHA pillars are based entirely on intergovernmental cooperation, and decisions have to be made unanimously. CFSP is a forum for foreign policy discussions, declarations, and common actions that work toward developing a security and defense policy. It has successfully developed positions on a range of issues and has established some common policy actions.

The EU is currently made up of fifteen member and thirteen candidate states and has expanded beyond its' economic and common market beginnings into the development of foreign policy and military capabilities. With its origin, as a purely economic organization, the EU has evolved into a political, economic and military organization sometimes in direct competition with the United States. Because of this, the United States relationship with the EU has been

tentative at best. There have been numerous confrontations between both sides of the Atlantic and, although mostly economic in nature, there has been increasing friction between the two based on American policies towards the Middle East.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

The development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has taken approximately ten years and is a direct result of the Maastricht Treaty which signaled the departure from the primarily economic component of the European Community towards a region in possession of significant political and military influence. Within the Treaty, the WEU would take the lead in the development and execution of military actions on behalf of the European Community.¹² During this initial period, the WEU extended invitations to non-NATO aligned European nations to join the WEU as associate members with the intention to create an organization that represented all of Europe in matters of common defense and security. At the same time, both side of the Atlantic agreed it was time to re-balance responsibilities within the Alliance between the United States and Europe for the defense and security of the continent.

To satisfy the requirements to both develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the need to rebalance the responsibilities within the Alliance, the WEU set out on a course to develop a European military capability within the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. The goal was to work within the existing NATO structure in order to reduce redundancy while strengthening the European Pillar of NATO.

NATO supported the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union as a means of strengthening the pillar and allowing the European members of NATO to make a more coherent contribution to the security of the alliance. NATO also supported the close and growing cooperation between itself and the WEU as a transparent and complementary organization, and agreed to make collective assets of the Alliance available based on consultations with the North Atlantic Council, for WEU-led operations in pursuit of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.¹³

NATO members agreed that ESDI should be built within the NATO structure, supported by the NATO military planning system, and to support the development of a military force utilizing NATO assets and capabilities operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.¹⁴ As in the past, the WEU would work within NATO to strengthen the transatlantic link.

In 1998, the Anglo-French Summit at St. Malo would change the European outlook on defense. The French, in the best Gaullist tradition of autonomy from the United States, wanted

to break away from the NATO structure and have an independent military capability. The British for their part, although supporting the development of an independent military capability, assured Washington that the issue was the improvement of capabilities, in the best interest of the Alliance and would, in fact, strengthen the transatlantic link.¹⁵ The British emphasis on capabilities and the French emphasis on independence led to a joint French-British declaration on European security that stated the intention to pursue a Rapid Reaction Force as the starting point for an autonomous military capability. The declaration was ambiguous about whether this force would be developed within or outside NATO.

Following the Maastricht Summit, the WEU defined its relationship with the EU and the Alliance as the defense component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance. The United States supported the WEU's position, keeping the EU's defense capabilities firmly anchored in NATO. The April 1999 Washington Summit reconfirmed NATO's position that the Europeans develop a defense identity and capability within NATO and not separately under the EU, and that NATO should have the first right of refusal for a force commitment. The first right of refusal gave the United States, through NATO, the opportunity to be involved in all significant political and military crises within Europe.¹⁶ This did not sit well with the French.

At the 2000 Cologne Summit, the EU seemed to shift slightly from the 'within NATO' position and suggested that the EU and not NATO become the organization of choice for response to a crisis in Europe. The language in the summit report describes ESDI as an autonomous capability backed by credible military force. Shortly after Cologne, the EU and WEU decided that the responsibility for the future development of European security and defense and corresponding structures would be assumed directly by the EU. The WEU roles and tasks taken in behalf of the EU for the development of security arrangement had, by the end of 2000, been transferred directly to the EU.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

For the EU, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) appears to be the next logical step in the realization of influential involvement on the international stage.¹⁷ The Anglo-French Summit at St. Malo, in December 1998, and the Helsinki Declaration that same year, set in motion the process aimed at generating the means and political will for the EU to become an international player in the foreign policy and security realm. ESDP provides the EU with a common security policy that covers all matters relating to its security - i.e., ESDP forms part of

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This common defense policy would lead to the common defense if the decision was adopted and ratified by the member states.

ESDP commits member nations to an ambitious program for building a rapid reaction force at the corps level. The EU established a headline goal for the structure of its new military force. The goal was to have a sixty thousand-man deployable force, an expansion in airlift and sealift and mechanisms for directing military and diplomatic operations in place by 2003. Supporting this force would require a manpower pool in excess of one hundred and twenty thousand personnel from the contributing member states. This force will be capable of executing missions across the spectrum of conflict, and in accordance with the Peterburg Tasks delineated in Bonn in 1992. These tasks include humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management.¹⁸ Additionally, the EU recognized the United Nations Security Council's primary responsibility concerning international peacekeeping and global security.

From the beginning, the United States supported ESDP, although with skepticism as to the ability of EU member nations to be able to actualize the force generation and modernization requirements. The United States was also concerned that redundant institutions would reduce capabilities needed for the restructuring of NATO. During that same period, the EU began using the term ESDP, vice ESDI, when describing future European defense and security. The difference between the two initiatives is that ESDP refers to a European-only military force separate from NATO.

The most recent European Council meetings have supported the desire of the EU to have the capability of an autonomous force to act in crisis management, where NATO has decided not to engage. These actions will comply with the United Nations Charter and acknowledges the authority of the United Nations Security Council.

Europe's defense needs have changed, and the EU has made the decision to take responsibility for its security arrangements into its own hands. The EU has therefore decided that it should be capable not only of acting independently in crisis management but also of intervening to prevent conflict. This step supports the goal of the EU not only to be responsible for economic and political stability, but also for the defense and security of Europe.

Currently the ESDP is progressing, however significant challenges are being faced by the member states. The required increases in defense funding levels to implement ESDP and associated programs are significantly taxing the already strained European economies. Member nations are facing the task of balancing social needs with the security requirements of

their nations. These choices are made even more difficult in light of the amount of current EU member deficit spending.

There is some good news on the development of ESDP. There has been some positive movement in NATO - EU cooperation and the ongoing working relationship. There are now modalities in place between the two organizations that allow the exchange of information on defense and security. Although these arrangements are currently at the working level, progress is being made and it is anticipated that regular senior level meetings between the organizations are likely in the near future.

The United States has initially endorsed the development ESDP but is waiting until 2004 when a more detailed assessment of the policy is due to be released to fully support this initiative.¹⁹

NATO RESPONSE FORCE

At the NATO Defense Ministers meeting held at Warsaw in September 2002, the United States submitted a proposal to establish a rapid reaction force that would enable the alliance to respond more quickly and powerfully to emergencies and conflicts outside of Europe.²⁰

The United States proposal expects the force, if approved by the member states, to be operational not later than 2006. It would consist of as many as twenty-one thousand troops, comprising air, land and sea units from Europe and North America, and be deployable within 30 days notice. The United States also proposed that member states assign troops to this standing force on a rotating basis in order to ease the strain on national defense budgets. In contrast to NATO's traditional focus on defensive operations within Europe, the proposed force would be designed for action outside Europe's borders and for a range of contingencies, from evacuations to all-out war.

"If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, which can deploy in days or weeks instead of months or years, then it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warned fellow ministers at the meeting.²¹

Some nations expressed reservations, specifically suggesting that its operations be limited to Europe and that such action by NATO would undermine efforts by the European Union to establish its own rapid reaction force. NATO authorities voiced confidence that the plan, aimed in part at strengthening readiness against terrorism, would complement not duplicate, or replace, Europe's own drive for a more rapidly deployable reaction force.

The Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 21 November 2002 supported the idea of a NATO Response Force (NRF).²² The Declaration stated that the North Atlantic Council supports the effort to:

“Create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council. The NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities. We gave directions for the development of a comprehensive concept for such a force, which will have its initial operational capability as soon as possible, but not later than October 2004 and its full operational capability not later than October 2006, and for a report to Defense Ministers in Spring 2003. The NRF and the related work of the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both organisations.”²³

The idea of a NATO Response Force builds both on the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the new NATO Command Structure combined with the new high readiness Force Structure.²⁴ “The aim is to designate:

- A pool of land, air and maritime combat forces to be employed under a Combined Joint Task Force HQ,
- Supported by NATO’s collective assets,
- Trained and equipped to common standards set by the Strategic Commands,
- Capable of being tailored to mission, readily deployable on short notice and over long distances,
- Combat ready and technically superior to any possible adversary,
- Capable of fighting in an NBC environment, and
- Self-sustainable for a certain period of time.

In essence:

- A response force that allows European and US forces to fight together whenever and wherever the Alliance political authorities decide to,
- A force that will set a standard for all NATO forces in the medium and long term.”²⁵

Although the NATO Reaction Force is in the early planning stages, there seems to be enough support and momentum within the Alliance that this initiative should be a reality in the next few years. The main hurdle for the full consensus will be the perceived competition with the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force for assets and capabilities.

EUROPEAN RAPID REACTION FORCE

One of the priorities of the EU has been to develop and introduce civil and military resources and capabilities to make and implement decisions on the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis management as defined in the "Petersberg Tasks".²⁶ The Amsterdam Treaty codified the decision by the EU to develop an autonomous military capability; to act where/when NATO decided not to engage, and to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. The EU felt that developing an autonomous military capability would strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy that represents the EU's underlying defense and security principles. To that end, the EU developed the headline goal of being able to deploy forces of up to corps level (sixty thousand men) within sixty days and sustain them for at least one-year. This force is commonly known as the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF). The EURRF is to be self-sustaining with the necessary command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics and, as required, air and maritime assets. The EU also decided to rapidly develop collective capability goals, particularly in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. At the same time, the EU was encouraging the countries that have applied for membership to the EU, and the non-EU European members of NATO, to contribute to improving Europe's military capabilities.

Once the appropriate political and military structures are in place, the goal in 2003 is to exercise control and strategic management of an EU-led operation, in line with the Petersberg Tasks. The EU has also identified the need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability of these forces in order to support the most demanding Petersberg missions. The EU feels that it remains essential to the credibility and effectiveness of ESDP that its military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the EU is in a position to intervene, either with or without access to NATO assets.

The EURRF is also facing significant challenges. The Headline Goal of an operational sixty thousand-man force will not make the 2003 milestone. Member states have found that it will be nearly impossible to train and re-equip the additional troops needed to support that force. Another issue is the implementation of a multinational force and the structure to support that

force. The complexity of consensus makes this development process even more complex and cumbersome.

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE/PRAGUE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT

The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was the direct result of the huge technological differences that were identified between the United States and Europe during the Kosovo campaign in 1999.²⁷ European forces could not match the American capabilities in precision munitions, surveillance, and stealth technology. Additionally the lack of strategic lift, combined with an immature logistic infrastructure further resulted in a slow and difficult deployment for the Europeans into the Kosovo region.²⁸

DCI was launched during the NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit held at Washington during April 1999. The focus of DCI is on Alliance capabilities in the following five overlapping areas:

- “Mobility and Deployability”: the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory;
- “Sustainability”: the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations;
- “Effective Engagement”: the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity;
- “Survivability”: the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats; and
- “Interoperable Communications”: command, control, and information systems that are compatible with each other, to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.

Within these five overlapping areas, fifty-eight specific capability enhancements have been proposed. These capabilities identified with the purpose to contribute to the development of ESDI, by strengthening European defense capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, with a view to enabling the European allies to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO.²⁹

While the DCI has contributed some improvements, progress has been slow and erratic. The Heads of State and Government at the NATO Prague Summit held November 2002 launched a new initiative that further refines and streamlines DCI. This new initiative

concentrates on a smaller number of capabilities essential to the full range of Alliance missions, to include capabilities to strengthen the defenses of the Alliance against terrorism. This initiative builds on the work begun by the NATO Defense Ministers identifying the following areas of improvement:

- “Defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks;
- Secure command communications and information superiority;
- Improvements in interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness;
- Rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces.”³⁰

The Heads of States and Governments codified the Defense Ministers initiative on DCI with a new program, the Prague Capabilities Commitment. The Prague Summit Declaration states that the North Atlantic Council:

“Approve the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. Individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. Our efforts to improve capabilities through the PCC and those of the European Union to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities Action Plan should be mutually reinforcing, while respecting the autonomy of both organisations, and in a spirit of openness.”³¹

The major difference between the PCC and DCI is the identification of more specific capabilities and the assumption of individual nation states as the “lead agency” for developing and fielding a specific capability. For example, Germany has taken on the responsibility to develop and field the shortage identified in the Alliances’ strategic airlift capability. The Netherlands has assumed the lead in the development of precision guided munitions, and Spain is working on improving the air to air refueling shortages within the Alliance. The belief is that with specific nations assuming specific identified shortages in capabilities; advances in reducing the capabilities gap will be accomplished faster and in a less costly manner.

ANALYSIS

When dealing with the changes in the relationships between the United States and Europe, it must be noted that there is no single European position. Europe is made up of many sovereign nations all with different languages, cultures, aspirations, and political agendas. Due in part to this diversity, since World War II Europe has sought to develop mutually supporting institutions for economics, security, and defense. The primary vehicles for the United States when dealing with Europe in the field of security are the two major organizations: NATO and the EU. Changes in relations between the United States and Europe will be reflected in the changes within the institutions itself (NATO) or with the institution's relationship with other institutions (NATO and the EU). This analysis will concentrate on the relationships within and between these institutions and not the multitude of bilateral agreements between the United States and individual European countries.

Europe remains one of the United States' vital interests. President Bush, in his address to the students at Warsaw University, clearly articulated that Europe, through NATO, remains the fundamental pillar of America's foreign and defense policy in Europe.³² The September 2002 National Security Strategy further articulates the importance of Europe to the United States.³³ The effort of the United States to eradicate terrorist organizations worldwide will not be successful without the support of our European allies and other allies throughout the world.

THE THREAT

Changes in the threat to Europe have served as the primary reason for the changes to the region's security architecture. The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact had a profound effect on the European outlook toward security in the region; gone are the days of the Soviet Union mounting an enormous mechanized attack through the gap into the heart of Europe. The requirements to maintain large standing armies that expend huge amounts of national resources, at least for the near future, are gone. The future threat requires security structures that are light, agile, self-sustaining, highly mobile, and capable of power projection beyond the region; everything the old Cold War structures were not. The European Security and Defense Initiative, the European Security and Defense Policy, NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force all reflect changing security initiatives to combat the future threat. The purpose of these initiatives is to keep the proposing institution relevant, effective and are the natural evolution from the Cold War mentality to a mentality that meets the new and developing threats.

AMERICAN VS EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

The United States looks at the world in a global light and expects Europe (collectively) to do the same. The rationale for this expectation is based upon the fact that Europe's population and gross domestic product equals that of the United States and that Europe wants to be an international military power. Although Europe, through the European Union is definitely a global economic powerhouse, most European leaders view their military interests regionally. Despite the collective potential, European leaders recognize the lack of a collective military capability necessary to shape international affairs and that will preclude a global vision. The key to global security from a European perspective is to maintain the status quo. They see potential adversities that could threaten the security of Europe deterred due to American military superiority. This view is contrary to that of the United States.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The WEU in cooperation with NATO authored the European Security and Defense Initiative, which was the first step in European self-defense. The initiative supported by the United States enabled a WEU-led limited crisis response operation using NATO assets and capabilities under the direction and political control of the WEU Council. The North Atlantic Council would have first right of refusal on the crisis before allocating NATO assets and capabilities. The operational commander would be a European, most likely Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (rotating billet between the United Kingdom and Germany) utilizing existing NATO planning and force generation systems. A considerable amount of agreed procedures and policies existed to ensure transparency between NATO and the WEU.

The United States relationship with the WEU through NATO was extremely strong. The WEU for its part was a strong supporter of NATO and was committed to the ideal of strengthening the European Pillar of the Alliance.

During the past decade, this changed somewhat; the WEU had become the proxy for the EU in the development of a European security and defense plan or initiatives. When the WEU transferred the responsibility directly to the EU, the relationship between the WEU and NATO essentially became non-existent. The expected continuation of ESDI was the direct transfer to the EU. This was not to happen. With the development of the ESDP, ESDI became a moot point.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

As Lord Ismay, the Alliance's first Secretary General said, the North Atlantic Alliance was intended to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down. Creating the

environment that fostered peace and security for the entire continent, NATO successfully prevented conflict and by all standards is the most successful alliance in history. For over fifty years, NATO has been the dominant security organization in Europe and will continue to be for the near future. With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO now faces the issue of relevance in the New World order. What began as a purely military alliance for the mutual defense of Europe against the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union was for the first time in its history searching for a mission. Both sides of the Atlantic felt that the huge Cold-War era military structure, the backbone of the Alliance, was outdated and obsolete.

The United States has been and remains the largest single contributor to the Alliance. For their part, the Europeans have largely enjoyed peace and security at the expense of the Americans. With the fall of the Wall, the United States has intensified pressure on the European members of the Alliance to share more of the burden for the security of Europe.

Burden sharing

For years, the United States complained that the European allies do not pay their fair share of the military costs of the Alliance. Even prior to the Soviet Union's pledge to withdraw substantial numbers of combat troops from Eastern Europe in 1988, the term "burden shedding" was used to describe the action take by the European Allies.³⁴ In fact, by 2000 NATO's European members' contribution to defense spending had decreased from 3.5 per cent (1980-1984 average) to 2.1 per cent (2000 estimate) of gross domestic product.³⁵ During that same period, American defense spending remained above the NATO-wide goal of 3 per cent of gross domestic product. Germany, with the strongest economy in Europe, saw its contribution fall from a high of 3.3 per cent (1980-1984) to 1.5 per cent of gross domestic product (2000 est.). Much of this German change was a result of the nation's enormous expenditures associated with re-unification. The fact remains that over the years there has been an unfair distribution of costs associated with membership and this issue has put a serious political strain upon the Alliance. There has been some positive movement to correct this downward trend recently, notably from the United Kingdom and France. Although not a member of the military structure, France continues to spend a significantly higher percentage of their gross domestic product than the rest of Europe and has supported numerous NATO crisis response operations from the national level.

Capabilities gap

The war in Kosovo drove home the undeniable reality that Europe is a mere junior partner when it comes to contributing to its own defense.³⁶ Without major reforms, NATO risks

becoming a two-tiered alliance in which the United States does the fighting and the Europeans pick up the garbage.³⁷ This issue caused great concern in Brussels as the alliance tried to deal with the 1999 conflict. The inability to actually operate as equals on the Kosovo battlefield significantly strained the US-NATO relationship during this period.

Even before the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had been urging the European allies be more responsible for their own security and defense. Post Kosovo NATO, realizing that the technology gap between the United States and Europe was widening, attempted to emphasize DCI to help reduce the gap. The United States introduced this initiative at the April 1999 NATO Summit with the purpose of keeping the Alliance relevant and to support the agreed position that Europe should be more responsible for its own defense. Ideally, DCI would also relieve the European perception of its serving as a second class actor, thus reducing the friction within the Alliance. However, the major problem with DCI was its overly broad scope. Intending to be more focused in scope and specific in capabilities, the PCC initiative has replaced DCI. The Commitment is intended to streamline capabilities building among the European allies and support the concept of a more European flavor for the defense of Europe.

The NRF initiative could greatly contribute to closing some of the political gaps that have occurred between members. As with DCI and PCC, NRF will potentially catalyze even greater change for the organization. If the American proposal is actually able to generate a force, always ready to deploy beyond Europe's borders at short notice, it will have brought 21st Century relevance to NATO.

The NATO alliance, with nineteen, soon to be twenty-six nation states, with different views and different domestic constituencies will always agree to disagree. Nevertheless, NATO remains the most successful alliance in the history of the world and will remain the European region's dominant security institution in the future.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The transfer of responsibility for future European security development from the WEU directly to the EU set the stage for a new security initiative. At St. Malo the United Kingdom and France agreed that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".³⁸ The EU's decision to establish a "Headline Goal" for military capabilities in order to undertake the full range of Petersberg Tasks supports the EU's desire to develop a common European policy on security which would militarily support the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This would provide the EU the means and capabilities for the

implementation of ESDP and was a departure from the work completed by the WEU on behalf of the EU with NATO cooperation.

ESDP, with the associated EURRF, was now the security initiative of choice that the EU used to replace the NATO sponsored ESDI. In order to continue the development of the ESDP, the EU also decided to develop arrangements for consultation with NATO and to ensure the necessary dialogue, with European NATO members who are not members of the EU on issues of security and defense.

The EU currently has fifteen-member nations of which ten are also members of NATO. The relationship between the two organizations is progressing to one of cooperation and transparency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States must remain involved in Europe and that involvement is in keeping with the current National Security Strategy of maintaining interests and alliances abroad. It is also imperative to the United States that NATO remains a viable organization. To that end, the United States must continue to encourage the enlargement and streamlining of NATO. With the self-realization of the EU as both an economic and potential military power, NATO could remain the only avenue for the United States to influence Europe.

The United States must support the EU in its entirety. The United States and the EU have had a long history of working together on economic and political issues. The linkage already exists between the United States and the EU and that linkage should be expanded to include the military side as well. The United States must support the EU's development of a European defense initiative with the associated military capability emphasizing that it compliments NATO and is not a competitor. Competing interests for diminishing resources could pose a resource-diversion risk to NATO and, in doing so, undermine the ability of NATO to undertake effective collective defense which is in the best interest of Europe and the United States.

The Alliance must make existing assets and capabilities available to be used under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. The United States must aggressively seek consensus between the NATO nations and the EU for the acceptance of NATO's offer of troops and equipment. The more NATO structure (planning, resourcing, command, and control) is injected into the military arm of the EU, the more American influence is assured on the European continent. The United States needs to definitively and decisively articulate to the EU that it is in the best interests of both organizations to develop mutual sourcing for men and

equipment. A European security initiative not only commits European Allies to enhance their defensive capabilities, but also strengthens both NATO and the EU.

The United States must also be prepared to apply political pressure to ensure that the EU, through a European security plan, restricts operations to a regional level. The capabilities to perform low-end operational missions (peacekeeping) are in keeping with the agreed Petersburg Tasks as well as with NATO's purposed structure for a Rapid Response Force. The acknowledgment of EU autonomy as well as keeping NATO a viable military force is critical for the success of both NATO and EU member states.

CONCLUSIONS

Europe must remain a vital interest to the United States. Although the United States is not militarily dependent upon Europe, they are economically interdependent with each other. The EU and American economies are the two biggest engines that presently drive the world's economy. The transatlantic link is not just NATO, it is also the twelve trillion dollars that annually flows between the United States and Europe. Europe is also vital to the United States politically. It is imperative that the United States gets the political and legal backing of Europe in the struggle against organized terror. Without that support, it will be almost impossible to succeed in the war against terrorism.

The changes in the European security architecture are the direct result of the changes in the threat since the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the reduced threat to Europe required the re-evaluation of the security and defense needs of the continent. The emergence of the new threat requires security structures that are light, agile, self-sustaining, and highly mobile; everything the Alliance is not. The United States is in the process of transforming its own military to counter this new threat and Europe must do the same.

Europe must have a regional, vice global perspective on security and defense. The United States assumes that Europe (collectively) is to be globally oriented because of the fact that the gross domestic product and size/education level of the population approaches that of the United States. With that assumption, the United States expects the collective European military structure to be capable of deploying a competent military force to most other parts of the world. Contrary to this assumption, most European leaders view Europe as more regionally oriented. A military that is structured for a regional defense is far less expensive than a globally orientated military, thus allowing more funding for political/social programs.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization must remain relevant. With the self-realization of the EU as both an economic and potential military power, NATO could remain the only avenue for the United States to influence Europe. The Transatlantic link is also as important now as it was during the height of the Cold War, especially relating to the war on organized terror. It remains central to the security and interests of North American and European member states. Long before the fall of the Wall, NATO had become more than just a military alliance. NATO had been a political/military organization that for years had allowed member states an additional option to solve issues between them. It is the only organization bridging the Atlantic that allows nineteen nations to meet regularly, discuss, and solve issues. The change in the threat to Europe, with the associated changes in the security architecture, does not mean the end to issues of mutual interest that the allies can solve together.

The EU is the Europe of the future. With the EU's population and economy approximating that of the United States, and with the projection of continued growth, the EU is likely to become a peer competitor to the United States. To ensure a continued mutually reinforcing relationship, the United States must establish stronger ties and linkages with the EU in the areas of economics and defense. There must be an understanding and acceptance of the autonomy of the EU by the United States. NATO must also continue to retain the wholehearted support of the United States, and evolve into a relationship with the EU that takes advantages of the strengths of the Union.

The United States has always supported Europe in the past, and will continue to in the future. It has invested billions of dollars in both reconstruction and in the defense of Europe. For its part, Europe has not always reciprocated that support. To remain relevant, the Transatlantic link needs to be mutually supporting on both sides of the Atlantic. It should not be unreasonable for the United States to expect political and military support from the Europeans for major issues of concern to the United States. For all its faults, the United States has been a committed and loyal partner to Europe and during this critical period for the United States in the War on Terror, and conflict with Iraq, it is time for Europe and the EU to return that support.

WORD COUNT =8,040

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